Department of Philosophy
University of Edinburgh
Chirimuuta, M. : ‘Minimal Models and Canonical Neural Computations: The Distinction of Computational Explanation in Neuroscience’, Synthese, 191, pp. 127–53.
Craver, C. F. : Explaining the Brain: Mechanisms and the Mosaic Unity of Neuroscience, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Craver, C. F. and Kaplan, D. [forthcoming]: ‘Are More Details Better? On the Norms of Completeness for Mechanistic Explanations’, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
Fodor, J. : ‘Special Sciences (Or: The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis)’, Synthese, 28, pp. 97–115.
Gibson, J. J. : The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception, Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin.
Kaplan, D. and Craver, C. F. : ‘The Explanatory Force of Dynamical and Mathematical Models in Neuroscience: A Mechanistic Perspective’, Philosophy of Science, 183, pp. 1–35.
Piccinini, G. : Physical Computation: A Mechanistic Account, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
 With Fodor () presenting the classic defence of the autonomy of psychology and the other special sciences.
 Consider, for example, Craver’s () proposal for a ‘mosaic unity’ in neuroscience, which would allow for integration between levels without rendering them fully reducible.
 See (Craver and Kaplan [forthcoming]) for a recent exploration of this middle ground in terms of the relationship between mechanistic explanation and abstract models.
 Although not entirely novel, as Piccinini presented a version of this proposal in his (, Chapter 6).