Thomas W. Polger
Department of Philosophy
University of Cincinnati
Crist, M. : ‘Exploring the Origins of Consciousness, Cephalopod and Human, with Peter Godfrey-Smith in Other Minds’, The Los Angeles Times, 2 December 2016.
Hoare, P. : ‘The Octopus as Intelligent Alien’, The Guardian, 15 March 15 2017.
Hunt, E. : ‘Alien Intelligence: The Extraordinary Minds of Octopuses and Other Cephalopods’, The Guardian, 28 March 2017.
Polger, T. and Sufka, K. : ‘Closing the Gap on Pain: Mechanism, Theory, and Fit’, in M. Aydede (ed.), New Essays on the Nature of Pain and the Methodology of Its Study, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Polger, T. and Shapiro, L. : The Multiple Realization Book, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Polger, T. and Flanagan, O. : ‘Natural Answers to Natural Questions’, in V. Hardcastle (ed.), Where Biology Meets Psychology: Philosophical Essays, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Putnam, H. : ‘The Nature of Mental States’, in his Mind, Language. and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2, New York: Cambridge University Press.
Roberts, C. : ‘Just How Smart Is an Octopus?’, The Washington Post, 6 January 2017.
Tye, M. : Tense Bees and Shell-Shocked Crabs: Are Animals Conscious? Oxford: Oxford University Press.
 In fact, Tye () does not ignore such factors himself, but repeatedly brings them to bear on questions of whether there are ‘defeaters’ for particular applications of the Newtonian rule. But there is no rule for what counts as a defeater, and in considering defeaters, Tye’s reasoning looks more like Godfrey-Smith’s. So the inferential heavy lifting for Tye is done by inference to the best explanation in general, after all, rather than by the Newtonian rule specifically.