I thank M. Morrison, B. Batterman, M. Leng, A. Baker, and M. Colyvan for reading a draft of this review. I am solely responsible for the final form of the text.
University of Bergen
Baker, A. : ‘Mathematical Explanation in Science’, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 60, pp. 611–33.
Bangu, S. : ‘Indispensability and Explanation’, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 64, pp. 255–77.
 He acknowledges the allusion to Salmon in his well-chosen title.
 For example, Colyvan, Baker, Leng, Pincock, Batterman, and so on; some of whom address the indispensability argument. Lange explicitly sets this issue aside in the book, so everything I say here takes this (legitimate) decision into account.
 Baker is explicit on this: the explanandum of any putative example must be ‘a purely physical phenomenon’ (, p. 625).
 Now I should perhaps add here that what I find remarkable are examples of the type Lange says do not fit his idea of ‘distinctively mathematical’, that is, examples in which mathematics plays an undeniably central role, and yet the explanandum is physical-contingent. My agreement with some of the authors of such examples is limited, but the subtleties of our differences are irrelevant here; for details, see my ().
 The explanandum is that a simple double pendulum has exactly four equilibrium configurations.
 On the other hand, if causal explanations are available only sometimes, then what is it about these situations that allows both types of explanations?
 This also holds for the Konigsberg bridges example, and perhaps all other examples; how disguised a mathematical proposition appears may be a matter of degree.