Department of Philosophy
University of Cambridge
Ahmed, A. : Evidence, Decision and Causality, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Allais, M. : ‘Le comportement de l’homme rationnel devant le risque: Critique des postulats et axiomes de l’école Américaine’, Econometrica, 21, pp. 503–46.
Broome, J. : ‘Review of McClennen 1990’, Ethics, 102, pp. 666–8.
Hammond, P. : ‘Consequentialist Foundations for Expected Utility’, Theory and Decision, 25, pp. 25–78.
McClennen, E. : Rationality and Dynamic Choice, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
May, K. O. : ‘Intransitivity, Utility, and the Aggregation of Preference Patterns’, Econometrica, 22, pp. 1–13.
Nozick, R. : ‘Newcomb’s Problem and Two Principles of Choice’, in P. Moser (ed.), Rationality in Action: Contemporary Approaches, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 207–34.
Pollock, J. L. : ‘A Resource-Bounded Agent Addresses the Newcomb Problem’, Synthese, 176, pp. 57–82.
Savage, L. J. : The Foundations of Statistics, New York: Wiley.
 See, for example, (May ).
 (Allais ).
 (p. 164, Footnote 23). Fatalism would seem to generate counterexamples to EWD as here stated (and indeed to the weaker principle SWD that I am about to explain). But it is possible to get around this by placing suitable general restrictions on the available event-partitions in a way that raises no special difficulties in the present case (p. 91).
 Cf. (McClennen , pp. 77-80).
 See (Hammond , pp. 37f).