Department of Philosophy
University of California, San Diego
Callender, C. : ‘Philosophy of Science and Metaphysics’, in S. French and J. Saatsi (eds), The Continuum Companion to the Philosophy of Science, London: Continuum, pp. 33–54.
French, S. : The Structure of the World, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
French, S. and McKenzie. K. : ‘Thinking Outside the Toolbox: Toward a More Productive Engagement between Metaphysics and Philosophy of Physics’, European Journal of Analytic Philosophy, 8, pp. 42–59.
French, S. and McKenzie. K. : ‘Rethinking Outside the Toolbox’ in T. Bigaj and C. Wüthrich (eds), Metaphysics in Contemporary Physics, Rodolpi: Brill, pp. 25–54.
Friedman, M. : Dynamics of Reason, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Hirsch, R. J. : ‘Maudlin’s Mathematical Maneuver: A Case Study in the Metaphysical Implications of Mathematical Representations’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 94, p. 170210.
Ladyman, J. : ‘Science, Metaphysics, and Method’, Philosophical Studies, 160, p. 3151.
Ladyman, J. and Ross, D. : Every Thing Must Go: Metaphysics Naturalized, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Livanios, V. : ‘Is There a (Compelling) Gauge-Theoretic Argument against the Intrinsicality of Fundamental Properties?’, European Journal of Analytic Philosophy, 8, pp. 30–8.
Maudlin, T. : ‘On the Unification of Physics’, Journal of Philosophy, 93, pp. 129–44.
Maudlin, T. : The Metaphysics within Physics, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
McKenzie, K. : ‘Looking Forward, Not Back: Supporting Structuralism in the Present’, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science (Part A), 59, pp. 87–94.
Myrvold, W. C. : ‘A Bayesian Account of the Virtue of Unification’, Philosophy of Science, 70, pp. 399–423.
Paul, L. A. : ‘Metaphysics as Modeling: The Handmaiden’s Tale’, Philosophical Studies, 160, pp. 1–29.
See, for example, (Friedman , Lecture 2).
Note that I could not pin-point exactly where an argument was given for the claim that the degree of explanatory power is in the eye of the beholder—perhaps he simply takes it to be obvious, as I suspect others do too.
I’m a little hesitant about this, as he writes that ‘different assessments about the relevance and impact of what I called empirical vulnerability’ (p. 202) also result in different assessments of epistemic risk, although he nowhere states that the degree of empirical vulnerability is open to interpretation. But whatever the subjectivity involved in judgements of epistemic vulnerability, it is clear that he takes the subjectivity with regard to explanation to be sufficient to establish voluntarism.
See, for example, (Myrvold ).
Precisely how ‘coherence’ and ‘conceptual unity’ differ I am admittedly unsure.
See (Paul ) for a particularly explicit example.
This argument was criticized in (Livanios ); we subsequently attempted to improve upon it in (French and McKenzie ) and (McKenzie ), though presumably this book was already written by the time these appeared in print.
Somewhat ironically, the one place where I recall seeing an IBE-type explanation explicitly invoked in the service of ontic structuralism is in Steven French’s argument against Chakravartty’s favoured dispositional essentialism on the basis of considerations of symmetry (French , Section 9.8). Perhaps this example would have served Chakravartty’s purposes better.
See especially (Maudlin ).